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I. INTRODUCTION
Intentionally destroying property-boundary markers by sawing
down the posts.' Causing environmental disasters. 2 Fraudulently
refusing to settle insurance claims within coverage limits. 3 Bad-faith
dealing in big oil contracts.4 Hiding mild weather damage to new
vehicles.5 Creating and marketing cigarettes while knowing about
their carcinogenic risks.6 Contributing to automobile accidents.7
No, these are not items on some nefarious villain's to-do list.
These are all examples of cases where courts have awarded punitive
damages against the tortfeasors on top of their compensatory liability.
While each tort is unquestionably wrong, some certainly appear more
wrong than others.
In recent years, punitive damages have become a fashionable
topic in the legal community-and unsurprisingly so, given their
prevalence and gaudy statistics. After all, civil plaintiffs in state
courts of general jurisdiction win over $40 billion each year in
punitive-damages awards,8 and this figure doesn't even include money
1. Newport Harbor Ass'n, Inc. v. Dicello, No. CV03-495284, 2005 WL 3750697 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 8, 2005).
2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
3. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
4. State v. Exxon Corp., No. CV 99-2368, 2001 WL 1116835 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 3, 2001),
rev'd Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ala. Dep't of Conservation and Natural Res., 986 So. 2d 1093, 1118
(Ala. 2007).
5. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
6. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255 (Or. 2008).
7. Sakamoto v. N.A.B. Trucking Co., 717 F.2d 1000, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying
Tennessee law, affirming an award of punitive damages where the defendant driver was a
habitual user of amphetamines and had been without sleep for forty hours before the accident).
8. There were 5,935,804 cases filed in state courts of unified or general jurisdiction in the
year 2005, the most recent year with reported data. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2006: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT 12 (National Center for State Courts, 2007), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.
org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT-/ctadmin&CISOPTR=1277. Surveys from the previous
decade indicate that around 7.2 percent of all civil cases filed in state courts end in either a
bench or jury trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 509 tbl.5 (2004) (reporting
data from ten states from 1992 through 2002 and finding that anywhere from 5.6 percent to 8.7
percent of all filed cases ended in either a bench or jury trial).
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recovered in federal court. Needless to say, such high figures draw
attention. Commentators, judges, and even nonlawyers have all
pointed to punitive-damages awards as evidence of a runaway judicial
system that throws out fiscal penalties like Monopoly money.
First to respond were the state legislatures. As of 2005, twenty-
nine states have instituted statutory caps on punitive-damages
recovery, and thirty-four states have amended their state codes to
reduce the magnitudes and frequencies of punitive-damages awards.9
Most of these limitations were implemented within the last twenty
years.10
The Supreme Court has also noticed the trend in punitive-
damages awards. In a series of decisions from 1991 to 2003, the Court
implemented procedural- and substantive-due-process restrictions on
punitive-damages awards, culminating in a holding that punitive-
damages awards more than nine times the magnitude of
compensatory rewards would rarely satisfy due process
requirements." More recently, in the litigation stemming from the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Court used its common-law-making
authority to place a more stringent ratio cap of one-to-one for punitive-
to-compensatory damages in maritime cases.12
Of the cases ending in trial, the plaintiffs won approximately 55 percent to 56.4 percent of
the time. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2005, at 4 tbl.5 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf, THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcv1cOl.pdf. Approximately 5 percent of the plaintiffs'
successes at trial included punitive-damages awards. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges,
and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992,
1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (2006). The average punitive damage
award in the surveyed cases was $2,557,262. Id. at 269 tbl.1.
Multiplying this estimated number of cases filed each year (5,935,804) times the percentage
of cases ending in trials (7.2 percent) times the likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing (average 55.7
percent) times the percentage of plaintiffs' awards including punitive damages (5 percent) times
the average award amount ($2,557,262) creates an estimated per-year amount of
$31,530,662,161 in 2001 dollars. Assuming a modest inflation rate of 3 percent, that translates
into over $41,140,362,456.05 in 2010 dollars.
9. Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 2nd) 8 tbl.1 (Nw. Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=902711.
10. See id. (recording the enactment and striking down of medical malpractice related
reforms and the number of changes from 1980 to 2005).
11. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("[Flew
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process"). For an overview of the Court's due process
jurisprudence on punitive-damages awards, see LINDA L. SCHLUETER, 5 PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.4
(2005).
12. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008).
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Despite the legislative and judicial changes to punitive-
damages jurisprudence, the doctrine remains in a state of disarray.
Some commentators call for the abolition of punitive damages
altogether,' 3 while others bemoan the restrictions imposed by the
Court and the state legislatures.14 It's easy to be pessimistic about the
prospects of establishing a predictable, rational, and efficient system
for awarding the damages.
The real problem with punitive-damages jurisprudence is that
neither the courts nor the political branches have decided what the
damages stand for. Do they make up for the legal limits on a wronged
plaintiffs compensation for his injuries? Are they meant to impose
criminal-like sanctions on the wrongdoer that go beyond eye-for-an-
eye justice? Without a theory that defines the basic purpose for the
damages, it has proven impossible to provide a reliable framework for
calculating and limiting them.
In this Note, I argue that the proper role-the only role-for
punitive damages is to disincentivize tortfeasors from engaging in
socially harmful conduct that would otherwise go undeterred. In order
to establish this role for punitive damages, Congress should use its
power to craft subject-matter jurisdiction over maritime law to
establish a comprehensive, meaningful, and useful system for
calculating punitive-damages awards to maximize effective deterrence
in admiralty cases. While maritime law only encompasses a small
portion of all punitive-damages jurisprudence, it is the ideal nesting
ground for doctrine reform. Congress can transfer the authority to
award punitive damages in maritime cases from juries to judges. Once
judges are shown to be more competent and more consistent
administrators of an organized, deterrent-maximizing punitive-
damages framework in maritime cases, the states will follow suit by
placing the power of awarding punitive damages solely in the hands of
the judiciary.
Part II of the Note lays out background information about
Congress's power to make maritime law and the historical role of
punitive damages in maritime cases. It then demonstrates how
confusion over the role of punitive damages in maritime cases has
13. Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional,
53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004); W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO.
L.J. 381 (1998).
14. See Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS.
L. REV. 169, 172; Lori Woodward O'ConneU, The Case for Continuing to Award Punitive
Damages, 36 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 873, 874 (2001) ("[Alrtificial caps on punitive damages
will fail to rectify the putative problems.").
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contributed to the current disarray of the doctrine. Finally, it presents
the three potential roles that punitive damages can possibly play.
Part III.A provides the first part of the thesis: deterrence is the
only function of punitive damages that is fair and efficient. This
defined deterrent role gives sufficient theoretical foundation for a
meaningful and coherent doctrine of punitive damages. The other two
potential roles for the damages-retribution and compensation-do
not serve goals of efficiency or fairness under the law.
The field of maritime law presents Congress with the ideal
jumping-off point in establishing a deterrence-maximizing system of
awarding punitive damages. Part III.B argues that Congress should
use its power to enact maritime law in order to create a national
scheme of awarding punitive damages that could not otherwise exist
because of structural limitations on federal power. Congress's power to
grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, combined with the
Seventh Amendment's failure to require jury trials in maritime cases,
would prevent forum shopping by litigants seeking plaintiff-friendly
punitive-damages awards by juries in state courts. Using empirical
evidence, I address and refute Justice Stevens's implied claim that a
statutory plan for awarding punitive damages should account for an
alleged compensatory role they currently serve due to unique
restrictions of maritime law.
In order to reach the optimal value for a punitive damage
award, the calculations should be performed by a judge who follows a
set of instructions designed to maximize deterrence-and only
deterrence. The first section of Part IV presents evidence that judges
are better at making efficient choices in awarding punitive damages
than juries. It also explains the instructions that the judges should
follow in order to reach an optimal award.
To implement a deterrence-maximizing mechanism of
awarding punitive damages, Congress must pass legislation that
amends the existing statutory grant of jurisdiction for maritime cases,
thereby creating new substantive law. Part IV.B outlines what this
new legislation should include.
I conclude with a brief overview of the impact of establishing a
meaningful punitive-damages framework in maritime cases. While a
statutory approach to punitive damages in maritime cases is not the
final solution for this divisive and controversial issue, it can serve as




II. OVERVIEW OF MARITIME LAW AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
There are three separate, but related, issues that deserve
attention before analyzing the possible roles of punitive damages.
First, the unique allocation of maritime law-making power among
Congress, the states, and the federal courts merits a brief explanation.
Second, the existing maritime laws on punitive damages present a
framework that any congressional legislation would abrogate. Finally,
the existing punitive-damages jurisprudence in admiralty cases sets
up an introductory discussion of the three primary roles that punitive
damages can serve in litigation.
A. Congressional Authority to Create Maritime Law
Maritime law in the United States is an amalgamation of
federal common law and federal statutes, with a few state laws
thrown into the mix.15 As a general matter, admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction extends to torts stemming from occurrences on navigable
waterways and to contracts formed in regard to shipping or other
matters related to the use of the navigable waterways.' 6 Congress has
broad legislative power to make laws governing the seas and
navigable waterways, but the federal courts have retained common-
law-making authority where Congress has not previously acted. The
states reserve some power to craft remedies for injured parties in
maritime cases because the savings clause granting "exclusive
jurisdiction" to the federal courts allows state courts to hear in
personam maritime cases where "suitors" are entitled to other
remedies.17
Congress has the power to make rules of decision governing
admiralty cases under both the Constitution's Necessary and Proper
Clause' 8 and the Interstate Commerce Clause.' 9 When Congress
exercises this authority and speaks on a matter of maritime law, the
15. International trade agreements also play an important role in governing maritime
disputes. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 87-88 (4th ed. 2001).
16. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, at 2-12 (providing an overview of admiralty
jurisdiction).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000).
18. Congress has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States ..... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Because the Constitution vests the federal
courts with jurisdiction over admiralty law, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Congress has the power to
craft the rules of decision for those cases.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
[Vol. 63:3:813818
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federal courts must defer to its judgment. 20 Legislation such as the
Jones Act 21 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act 2 2 provide important statutory foundations for a great deal of
modern maritime law.
Despite the congressional grant of authority, the Framers
recognized that the Supreme Court needed the authority to implement
and develop the "General Maritime Law," a common-law body of
concepts and rules that ensured uniform application of laws across the
states. 23 Accordingly, the Constitution grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over matters of maritime law.2 4 Congress implemented
this subject-matter jurisdiction in a statute granting these courts
jurisdiction over "any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction."25 At one time, common law was the dominant law
governing maritime cases, but the legislature has since overtaken it as
the primary source of maritime rules of decision.26 Even with the
recent expansion of statutory rules governing maritime cases,
however, the federal courts have retained a good bit of power to create
new law.27 Federal maritime law can preempt state law when the need
for uniformity among the courts trumps the state's interest in
upholding its own common law or legislation.28
The states have retained very limited lawmaking authority in
cases involving the navigable waterways. State legislation is not valid
20. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) ("Congress retains superior
authority in these matters [of maritime law], and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to
overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.").
21. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2000). Formally known as "The Merchant Marine Act of 1920," the
Jones Act codified the rights of workers employed on vessels at sea to recover damages against
an employer, captain, or co-worker for negligence.
22. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2000). The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
codifies rights for " 'longshoremen,' land-based workers who perform a variety of tasks for, on,
and around vessels" similar to those of seamen under the Jones Act. SCHOENBAUM, supra note
15, at 326.
23. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575-76 (1874).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress implemented this grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, and the statute has remained almost unchanged.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
26. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, at 87
("[F]ederal legislation is now the dominant source of substantive admiralty law.").
27. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979)
("Admiralty law is judge-made law to a great extent."). For a discussion of the survival of federal
common-law in admiralty matters after Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, § 3-1, at 106-09.
28. See AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1002
(11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the "the federal interest in uniformity" can cause courts to
choose federal common law over state law); Mink v. Genmar Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1548
(11th Cir. 1994).
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"if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of
Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of
the general maritime law . . . ."29 While Congress always has authority
to preempt state laws under the Supremacy Clause, 30 special concerns
support this broad preference in favor of federal preemption in
matters of admiralty law. The very reason for federal jurisdiction over
admiralty law is the need for uniformity across the states.31
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "Congress has
paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall
prevail throughout the country."32 Although state laws may prevail in
narrow circumstances in which the states have a strong interest in the
subject matter and the laws do not call for uniformity, 33 implementing
consistent punitive damage standards is a matter that requires
national uniformity and presents a matter of strong federal interests,
giving Congress the last word in this area of the law.
B. Punitive Damages in Maritime Cases
Courts have divided over whether maritime law permits
parties to recover punitive damages. As early as 1818, the Supreme
Court indicated its willingness to award "exemplary" and "vindictive"
damages in maritime cases.34 While not called "punitive" at the time,
these damages now are recognized as tantamount to the doctrine as
currently understood by the federal courts.35
29. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
30. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
32. S. Pac. Co., 244 U.S. at 215.
33. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo,
817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987).
34. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818). The Court did not distinguish
between the two types of damages in the case, but Justice Story had earlier explained that
"vindictive compensation" was only appropriate when "the misconduct has been very gross, and
left destitute of all apology," while exemplary damages had a lower standard. The Lively, 15 F.
Cas. 631, 632 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812). For an in-depth explanation of these terms, see David W.
Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 88-95 (1997).
Other scholars have not shown any reluctance in interpreting The Amiable Nancy as a case
where the Supreme Court supported the award of punitive damages in maritime law.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, § 3-17, at 170-71. Commentators have erroneously observed that
damages had not been awarded in federal courts before 1859 in Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 F.
Cas. 1091 (N.D. Cal. 1859), aff'd, 30 F. Cas. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1859). See Byron Boeckman, Punitive
Damages in Admiralty, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 995, 997 (1967).
35. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008) (presenting a history of
punitive damages in admiralty and noting that common law punitive damages were sometimes
called "exemplary damages").
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Despite persisting relatively unchanged for more than 150
years, this jurisprudence veered suddenly in 1990 when the Court
decided Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation.36 Plaintiffs in Miles, the
family of a seaman killed as a result of the unseaworthiness of his
employer's vessel, sought recovery of damages for loss of consortium
and companionship, and for future earnings forfeited. 37 The Court
held that no recovery was possible, noting that neither the Jones Act
nor the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") permitted such
recovery. Determining that Congress had effectively spoken on the
issue, the Court declined to exercise its own maritime authority to
allow the decedent's family to recover for loss of consortium and
companionship and for forfeited future earnings-typical categories of
compensatory damages. 38
On the surface, it would appear that the Miles decision had no
direct impact on federal maritime common law in regard to punitive
damages. 39 The lower federal courts, however, broadly interpreted the
decision as creating an "analytical framework" that indicated a
changing tone in maritime law for the awarding of punitive
damages. 40 Some courts interpreted Miles to mean only that
nonpecuniary damages-damages for which there is no easily
discernible monetary value, like damages for the loss of a seaman's
consortium-were not available under the Jones Act. 4 1 Other courts
interpreted the holding more broadly, holding that Miles precludes a
seaman from recovering any type of non-economic damages-damages
meant to do more than simply compensate the seaman for his injuries,
including any punitive damage-against his employer for failure to
pay maintenance and cure.42 Finally, some courts read the Miles
decision broadly enough to bar a plaintiff from recovering punitive
damages in any maritime case at all.4 3
In light of this confusion, the Supreme Court recently provided
a needed clarification on the availability of punitive damages in
36. 498 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1990).
37. Id. at 21-22.
38. Id. at 36.
39. See Robertson, supra note 34, at 139 ("Miles did not involve or discuss punitive
damages.").
40. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1505-06, 1510 (5th Cir. 1995).
41. See Robertson, supra note 34, at 139 n.376 (collecting cases).
42. "Maintenance and cure" is "compensation provided to a sailor who becomes sick or
injured while a member of a vessel's crew." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 822 (8th ed. 2004).
43. See Robertson, supra note 34, at 140 n.379 (collecting cases). Professor Schoenbaum
reads the Miles decision similarly, as prohibiting a seaman's recovery of punitive damages
against his employer for any reason, not just for failing to pay maintenance and cure.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, § 3-17, at 171.
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maritime cases. In Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, a five-vote
majority held that punitive damages were available to claimants in
maritime actions generally and also in maintenance-and-cure cases
specifically.44 The Court claimed that the Miles decision remained
alive and well, explaining that it simply stood for the proposition that
there was no existing cause of action for wrongful death under general
maritime law. The Townsend Court concluded that the existing
legislative signals indicated that it should not create a new cause of
action.4
So, as the law stands today, punitive damages are still a
prospect-or possibly a threat-for litigants in maritime cases. As a
result, maritime cases provide the perfect laboratory for testing a new
approach to punitive-damages jurisprudence as a whole.
C. Possible Roles Served by Punitive-Damages Awards
The difficulties the courts have had in determining the
availability of punitive damages under maritime law illustrates the
more general problem of defining the role or purpose of punitive
damages. As a general rule, admiralty courts follow the general trend
of the federal courts in nonmaritime cases, viewing punitive damages
as serving the dual roles of deterring others from engaging in socially
harmful conduct and of punishing-or, in language often used taking
"retribution" against-the defendant. 46 At the same time, the most
stringent limitation on recovering punitive damages in maritime cases
comes from drawing an analogy between punitive damages and
compensatory damages for loss of society, which are both precluded by
the Jones Act and the DOHSA. 47
In other words, neither the courts nor the legislature has
decided the proper function of punitive damages in maritime cases.
Not surprisingly, the same problem exists for punitive-damages
jurisprudence as a whole, where courts will alternatively claim to
adopt one or two of the purposes, but then fail to lay a theoretical
foundation for a meaningful system of recovery. The only area of
agreement is that punitive damages should serve at least one of the
three roles commonly noted: (1) a deterrence function that discourages
similarly situated defendants from engaging in the same socially
44. 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2569-70 (2009).
45. Id. at 2572.
46. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, § 3-17, at 170 & nn.4-6.
47. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990).
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harmful behavior; (2) a retribution function that punishes a tortfeasor
for the moral blameworthiness of its action; or (3) a compensation
function that helps to make up for the tort victims injury in a way that
normal compensatory damages cannot. Part III.A analyzes each of
these possible roles.
III. MAXIMIZING DETERRENCE IN MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The major source of conflict over how to set punitive damages
is a severe lack of theoretical groundwork that should leave legal
scholars shaking their heads in disbelief. In order to craft a
meaningful method for punitive-damages awards, we first need to
adopt a shared understanding of the doctrine's raison d'etre.
A. Punitive Damages Should Only Serve to Deter Tortfeasors from
Socially Harmful Conduct
As noted above, courts and commentators generally agree
about the three possible functions punitive damages can serve. But
they disagree on which function-or functions-represents the most
efficient way for using punitive damages to maximize social welfare.
After analyzing each function, this Part concludes that deterring
wrongful conduct by forcing defendants to internalize costs they
otherwise pass on to society is the only proper function of punitive
damages in tort law.
1. Deterrence
Courts generally recognize deterrence, along with retribution,
as one of the two main goals of punitive-damages awards. 48 This
recognition accords with the historical development of punitive
damages in tort cases. The awards originally were recognized to be
''exemplary" damages that served as a warning to other potential
tortfeasors. 49
48. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 & n.9 (2008) (citing cases).
49. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 18, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (1763) (K.B.) (Lord Chief Justice
Pratt). The majority opinion in Baker explains that the term "exemplary" refers to the damages'
punishing-or what I call retributive-purpose. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2620.
According to Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, "exemplary" means "serving as a
warning; monitory; as, exemplary justice, punishment, or damages." WEBSTER'S REVISED
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 529 (MICRA 1996) (1913). This definition clearly fits the use of the




The basic theory behind deterrence is that punitive-damages
awards force social actors to incorporate all the costs they impose on
society, including those for which they might otherwise not be held
liable.50 This allows the actors to make efficient decisions about
whether to undertake an action. If it causes a net gain to society, they
will act; if it causes a net loss, they will not act.51 Scholars have widely
accepted this theory to justify harsh criminal penalties in cases where
the criminals are unlikely to be caught.52
In practical terms, punitive-damages awards that optimize
social efficiency have two variables. Under the first variable, a
decisionmaker must calculate the actual harm done to society by each
instance of an actor's conduct. In our tort system, this type of
compensation is reflected by compensatory damages, which consist of
the money that an actor is forced to pay to another person to make up
for the harm it inflicted.53 The second variable is the possibility that
the tortfeasor is repeating this conduct without paying compensatory
damages to all those harmed by it. In this case, a deterrent theory of
punitive damages would include a multiplier that corresponds to the
likelihood that a defendant is getting away with misconduct.54
This concept is easy to demonstrate. Suppose a bank
overcharged its customers $1 on each ATM transaction made in the
state of Tennessee. Assuming that the bank takes no remedial action,
a set of plaintiffs consisting of those who made ATM withdrawals
within a certain period of time could form a class-action lawsuit and
recover compensatory damages that represent the full harm to the
plaintiff-class. For this example, assume there are 10,000 class
members with five transactions apiece, for a total of $50,000.
Suppose, however, that evidence shows that this bank has
followed this practice for years in other states, but had never been
caught before. Perhaps the statutes of limitations have run for such
claims, or the evidence is not strong enough to prove individual cases,
50. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 977
(2007); see also Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
365, 401-02 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (1838-43) (laying out the basic utilitarian theory that
serves as the foundation for efficient deterrence goals).
51. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARv. L. REV. 869, 878-87 (1998).
52. Id. at 877 n.14.
53. The idea that compensatory damages encompass all of an injured party's harm is a legal
fiction, but it is a necessary one in order to develop a meaningful deterrent function for punitive
damages. As I'll discuss below, a system that presumes that compensatory damages make the
tort victim completely restored leaves open an incentive for courts and legislatures to constantly
reevaluate whether the compensatory damages satisfy that goal.
54. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 889.
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so no other class has recovered. The jury, however, is convinced that
the bank knew it only risked a 50 percent chance of getting caught
when it chose to engage in this practice. In effect, the bank is profiting
economically by realizing the gains of its actions and passing the costs
on to society. Even though it was only caught in one case and had to
return the $50,000 to society, it still profits from those instances in
which it escaped detection.
In this case, a jury should award punitive damages of $50,000
to accompany the $50,000 in compensatory damages, totaling
$100,000: the net sum of economic profits the bank realized through
its illegal practices.55 This recovery amount removes the incentive for
the defendant to engage in this misconduct; even though it only incurs
liability in court half the time, it pays out the full value it receives
from overcharging.56 Once forced to incorporate the costs it imposed on
society into its calculus, the defendant will choose the efficient result
of not overcharging in the first place.
There is a strong case for using punitive damages to deter
actors from imposing costs on society; the difficulty arises in the actual
method used. For now, it is enough simply to identify deterrence as a
valid goal for punitive damages.
2. Retribution
Scholars and judges have reached near unanimity in declaring
retribution a proper goal of punitive-damages awards. By
"retribution," these commentators indicate that one role of punitive-
damages awards is to levy a fine on defendants for their moral
blameworthiness in imposing costs on society or certain individuals.57
On its face, this claim is uncontroversial; after all, the awards are
"punitive," so shouldn't they serve a "punishing" role?
Efficient use of punitive damages, however, should not
incorporate a retributive role for punishing tortfeasors. Commentators
accepting retributive theories of punitive damages have taken their
usefulness at face value, leading to undertheorization of retribution as
an appropriate goal for punitive damages to serve. Upon closer
55. The one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in this example is
unfortunate, as it mirrors the ratio the Supreme Court arrived at as a cap in Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker through other means. 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008). The proper multiplier of damages is
not a constant, but entirely dependent on the defendant's chance of evading liability. Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 51, at 889-90.
56. This system also assumes that litigation is costless, which is obviously a legal fiction.
But, at least in this example, it guarantees that the defendant will not engage in the action
because the net profit will be negative ($0 minus litigation costs).
57. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 948-50.
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analysis, the rationale underpinning retribution as a goal for punitive
damages becomes much less convincing.
There are two parts to this analysis. First, punitive damages
levied against corporations-the typical target for punitive-damages
awards58-fail to assign moral blameworthiness to the correct actor
while penalizing numerous innocent ones in the process. Second,
courts should not use punitive damages for retributive purposes
because doing so blurs the distinction between civil liability and
criminal culpability.
First, whom do courts punish when they levy punitive damages
against corporations? It doesn't make sense to punish the company
itself. Corporations do not have souls and cannot incur moral
culpability. They are not part of the social contract of society, but
merely a construction of law. As Professors Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell point out, they are inanimate objects that can be
manipulated by human actors. 5 9 It makes no more sense to punish a
corporation as an entity for wrongdoing than it does to punish a tree
for falling over on someone.60 Instead, the more reasonable objective is
either to punish the people in the corporation who actually caused the
harm, or at least to give the company the incentive to punish them
itself.
When courts levy punitive damages against corporations in
order to punish individual actors, a host of innocent actors are caught
in the crossfire. Shareholders, many of whom are mere traders with no
long-term interests in the company, will bear the brunt of a significant
punitive-damages award.61 While it may be reasonable to penalize
active shareholders who have control over the company's actions, it
does not follow that passive investors should share in moral
culpability, particularly when passive or diffuse shareholders are
unable to control or punish the culpable actors themselves. 62
Similarly, large punitive-damages awards will be passed on to
customers. These customers have little or no direct control over the
corporation's actions, and few people would suggest that they share
moral blameworthiness for the company's deeds.63 While it might
make sense from an efficient-deterrence standpoint to spread costs to
customers, it can't be justified from a retributive perspective.
58. F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards:
"Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 387 (2008).
59. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 949.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 951-52.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 952.
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Even if the need to use the corporation to punish the
blameworthy individuals actually engaging in the harmful conduct is
important enough to allow such collateral damage, punitive damages
will not necessarily meet this need. Corporations may be unable to
identify the blameworthy actors. 64 If they do, these employees can
escape internal discipline simply by quitting their jobs. 65 In either
case, the punitive damages will not serve any retributive function
because the penalty won't be levied on the blameworthy individual.
Second, allowing courts to punish conduct for its
blameworthiness blurs the distinction between criminal and civil
sanctions. The current system of punitive-damages awards affords
great discretion to the decisionmaker, 66 which can lead to culpability
for moral blameworthiness that would not exist under criminal law.
Allowing punitive damages to undermine the complex mechanism for
determining moral blameworthiness is an abuse of a tort system
designed to make injured plaintiffs whole,67 not to punish wrongful
conduct-the domain of criminal law.
Professor Anthony Sebok proposes a hybrid use for punitive-
damages awards that is closely related to a retributive theory.68
According to Sebok's interpretive theory of punitive-damages awards,
the awards represent some form of personal revenge and retribution
against the tortfeasor for injuries to the victim's private rights-or, as
Sebok puts it more bluntly, for the "insult."69 Sebok concludes that
this way of understanding punitive damages better comports with
reality than claiming an efficient deterrence rationale. 70
Although Sebok's theory is engaging, it does not serve as a
workable framework for a normative proposal for utilizing punitive
damages. Quantifiable harms to a person-whether they are physical,
emotional, or mental-should be classified as compensatory damages
and factored into tort law accordingly. Punitive damages should be left
to their deterrent role-one that Sebok acknowledges is valid, but
argues is rarely achieved under the current system.7' This is precisely
the reason why a new implementation of punitive-damages
jurisprudence is timely and appropriate.
64. Viscusi, supra note 13, at 383 (citing Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 950-51).
65. Id.
66. George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1, 4
(Cass L. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
68. Sebok, supra note 50, at 1006.
69. Id. at 1023.
70. Id. at 1036.




The theory that punitive-damages awards should compensate
for the injuries done to victims who have brought suit that are not
otherwise recoverable has long pervaded punitive damage
jurisprudence. 7 2 Most commentators and judges agree that, for some
time in American history, punitive damages served a compensatory
purpose. 73 The Supreme Court has expressed this opinion in several
different cases. 74 But, each time in recent history, the Court also has
noted that the need for compensatory punitive damages has
diminished to the point that it no longer exists, given that courts and
legislatures have expanded recovery of simple compensatory
damages. 75 According to the Court, allowing damages for
nonpecuniary harms like emotional distress has displaced the old
compensatory functions of punitive damages. 76
Despite the Court's insistence that the law has evolved past its
crude stage of using punitive damages to compensate tort victims, the
theme comes up repeatedly in both academic circles and the Court's
own dealings with statutory damage multipliers. Despite the scholarly
commentary and Supreme Court jurisprudence, compensation should
be left to the realm of compensatory damages. Compensation, simply
put, is not a proper function for punitive damages.
As a broad proposition, the idea that punitive damages should
serve a compensatory function in some cases receives support from
academic writers. Scholars often support the use of punitive damages
to compensate tort victims for injuries from which victims could
otherwise not recover, such as litigation expenses or emotional harms
not included in tort recovery. While scholars share this basic premise,
72. Unlike deterrence goals, all of the victims of misconduct seeking punitive damages for a
compensatory purpose are present in court and not barred from recovery; the only limits on their
damages come from legal constructions, not the defendant's ability to get away with wrongdoing.
When punitive damages are used to compensate for social harms rather than litigants in court,
they are being used in a deterrent-not compensatory-way, as discussed below.
73. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257, 1262-64 & nn.17-23 (1976) (describing the history of punitive damages).
74. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437-38 n.11
(2001) ("Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages frequently operated to compensate
for intangible injuries, compensation which was not otherwise available under the narrow
conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time.").
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520
(1957)). Not all scholars agree that the Court's interpretation of the law is an accurate reflection
of reality. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the
History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 204 (2003), for a different
perspective.
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they vary widely in the types of injuries that they think should be
compensated. Professor Richard W. Wright interprets all punitive
damages as serving the purpose of compensating a plaintiff for her
"discrete dignitary injury."77 Punitive damages make up for the
personal indignity suffered by a tort victim whose rights have been
ignored or trampled. The breadth of this interpretation becomes clear
from Wright's declaration that "all of the remedies in tort law,
criminal law, and contract law are compensatory or rectificatory in
nature."78
Other scholars make a more concrete assertion based on the
history of this country's case law. Early American courts did not claim
that the sole purpose of punitive damages was to compensate for
injuries to the victim's dignity.79 Instead, Professors Martin Redish
and Andrew Matthews argue that punitive damages served the dual
functions of compensating for some of the tort victims' injuries and
punishing the defendant for his deeds.80 In this sense, compensation is
a proper role for punitive damages to serve when they are also used in
retribution against the tortfeasor.
When confronted with the issue, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that statutory treble-damage awards are punitive in
nature, but nevertheless still serve some compensatory goals. The
Court has shown a willingness to affirm punitive-damage-like awards
because of their compensatory nature. The False Claims Act ("FCA")
offers a prime example. Congress first passed the FCA in 1863,
creating civil liability for "any person .. . who knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval."81 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the FCA's phrase "any
person" did not create civil liability for the states.82
One basis for this holding came from the statute's damage
multiplier: the original statute provided for double damages, while the
contemporaneous version, enacted in 1982, provided treble damages.
While the Court previously had recognized that a damage multiplier of
77. Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1425, 1431 (2003). Wright echoes the statements of Thomas B. Colby in Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 583, 613-36 (2003).
78. Wright, supra note 77, at 1433 (2003).
79. Sebok, supra note 76, at 180.
80. Redish & Mathews, supra note 13, at 1.
81. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
82. 529 U.S. 765, 768 (2000).
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two was not a punitive award, it held in Stevens that treble damages
were in fact punitive in nature.83 This holding provided support for the
idea that the statute did not create liability for the states, given the
presumption against an interpretation that would allow punitive
damages against governmental entities. 84
The Court's next rendezvous with the FCA produced an
interesting twist on this doctrine. In Cook County v. United States ex
rel Chandler, a unanimous Court held that municipalities were liable
for treble damages under the FCA.85 Although the Court relied on the
FCA's definition of "person" as including corporations and
municipalities, it picked up the question of how the statute's punitive
nature affected whether it applied to municipalities.
The Court softened its stance on the statute's punitive design
by acknowledging that ostensibly punitive statutes could also serve
compensatory goals: "[I]t is important to realize that treble damages
have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to
punitive objectives."8 6 The Court had no problem allowing the treble
damages that it had previously described as "not [meant] to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers"87 to make up for the costs
imposed on the federal government by the party in violation.88
In contrast to the arguments for punitive damages to make up
for damages incurred by the individual tort victims, a second theory
justifies punitive damages as compensating for harms to society as a
whole. In separate instances, and by separate methods, Judge Guido
Calabresi and Professor Catherine Sharkey argue the general
proposition that punitive damages should compensate societal losses.89
In situations where society suffers harms that cannot be recovered in
83. Id. at 785-86 (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981) ("The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future,
unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers.")); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943) (noting that double damages in the original FCA were not
punitive, but suggesting that treble damages, such as those in the antitrust laws, would have
been).
84. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 262-63 (1981).
85. 538 U.S. 119, 134 (2003).
86. Id. at 130 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 635-36 (1985); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575
(1982)).
87. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 639.
88. Chandler, 538 U.S. at 130-31.
89. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245-46 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347
(2003).
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a tort action, punitive damages allow individual litigants to recover
them and create an efficient deterrent effect. 90
Despite its many faces, the basic argument for using punitive
damages for compensatory purposes comes in two forms: (1) we should
make up for injuries to victims that otherwise are unaccounted for in
the legal system; or (2) we should compensate for the social harms
that tortfeasors inflict. Neither of these arguments offers a compelling
rationale for adopting a compensatory role for punitive damages.
First, Polinksy and Shavell offer a persuasive argument
against using punitive damages to compensate plaintiffs. 91 They posit
that if the law deems it appropriate to exclude certain types of losses
from the plaintiffs recovery because courts are unable to price the
loss, then those losses will not be accurately priced by punitive
damages. 92 Moreover, if the loss can be calculated by a court and is of
the type society would generally consider recoverable, only allowing
that loss to manifest itself as punitive damages would prevent
wronged victims from recovering for the injury the vast majority of the
time.93 In other words, if these losses are real and tangible, why
should the law create the high hurdle of reprehensibility or other
restrictions on punitive damages to bar their recovery?
Their point is this: if courts hide calculable compensatory
damages under the cover of punitive damages, they invariably create a
hybrid system that no court can handle effectively. Either the
damages should be recoverable by a plaintiff free from the burden of
proving reprehensibility and other bars, or these damages should be
understood as not truly compensatory in nature.
Second, the argument that punitive damages should
compensate for social harms is not compelling because it is in fact a
deterrence rationale, not a compensatory one. Efficient deterrence
posits that punitive damages will be awarded to make up for the
tortfeasor's ex ante determination of the probability it will be forced to
pay damages for the harms its actions impose on others. Calabresi's
and Sharkey's basic theories simply turn the question into an ex post
consideration of how much harm the defendant has inflicted on
society. In practice, this should lead to the same result either way.
But, at heart, this is an efficient deterrence rationale.
90. See also Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 263, 306 (2008) (arguing that using punitives is good when it provides deterrence, even if
this is closer to a compensatory goal).
91. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 869.




Deterrence is the only valid role for punitive damages to serve.
Allowing punitive damages to serve retributive or compensatory
functions both undermines their predictability and effectiveness and
inhibits the development of the law in ways that actually punish
conduct that society will condemn as criminal, or that compensate
victims for harms suffered in order to make them whole.
B. The Field of Maritime Law Presents the Ideal Opportunity to Begin
Reforming Punitive-Damages Jurisprudence
Congress should begin crafting a deterrence-optimizing
punitive-damages doctrine by passing legislation to create a statutory
framework for punitive-damages awards in maritime cases. This sort
of legislation would establish a nationwide standard for awarding
punitive damages that the states could emulate. Unique parts of
Congress's maritime-law-making authority make this area more
appealing than just a framework for awarding damages in general
district-court legislation.
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Forum Shop around the Framework
Congress has the power to make the federal courts the
exclusive forum for maritime cases.94 This power is an important part
of maritime jurisdiction because the substantive maritime laws
crafted by Congress and the federal courts might not govern in
personam suits involving maritime cases filed in state court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333, the statute granting the federal courts jurisdiction over
matters of maritime law, includes a savings clause that reserves
states' courts' jurisdiction to hear in personam maritime cases where
"suitors" are entitled to other remedies. 95 In effect, this means that
plaintiffs in admiralty cases can bring ordinary civil actions in state
court; state rules might then allow the plaintiff a jury trial.96 Even in
cases where Congress creates substantive maritime law that
establishes a deterrence-maximizing framework, there remains the
possibility that state courts would not follow it effectively; appellate
review of the federal claims might mitigate, but would not eliminate,
this concern.
The allure of state courts applying different-and possibly
more plaintiff-friendly-punitive-damages award mechanisms in cases
94. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, HART & WESCHLER'S FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 25-26, 535 (6th ed. 2009).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000).
96. See Lavergne v. W. Co. of N. Am., Inc., 371 So. 2d 807, 809 (La. 1979).
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would create an incentive for forum shopping. Because defendants
only can remove maritime cases to federal court when the federal
court has separate grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction other than
the maritime nature of the case,97 plaintiffs will control which court
decides the case in many instances. By exercising its power to make
maritime jurisdiction exclusive, Congress would eliminate forum-
shopping concerns to an extent that it could not in any other area of
law. 98
2. Maritime Cases Are Not Required to Be Tried by a Jury
Congress can implement a solution that does not involve a jury
determination because plaintiffs do not have a right to a trial by jury
of a civil admiralty claim. 9 The Constitution only requires a jury to
decide questions of criminal law and suits at common law. 00 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize explicitly that juries do not
try admiralty claims.101 This freedom would let Congress create a
framework without even considering the implications of the Seventh
Amendment.
3. Courts Do Not Use Punitive Damages for Compensatory Purposes
in Maritime Cases
Justice Stevens's dissent in Baker offers a different perspective
on punitive damages in maritime cases. Stevens claimed that punitive
damages served as a way of compensating maritime plaintiffs for
injuries that were not fully redressed under maritime tort law.102 This
assertion is significant: if Stevens is correct, then a system of
awarding damages premised solely on deterrence will lead to
undercompensated plaintiffs. In that case, Congress should either
97. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371-72 (1959).
98. Congress obviously could not constitutionally pass legislation that called for a specific
mechanism for awarding punitive damages in all tort cases because it would lack authority
under Article I of the Constitution. If it established a punitive-damages framework that applied
to all federal causes of action, forum shopping would remain a serious problem as plaintiffs
would file their claims under applicable state law causes of action, or seek out state courts that
applied the federal law in a more lenient manner.
Congress has already conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts in
suits under the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, the Ship Mortgage Act, the Suits in
Admiralty Act, the Public Vessels Act, and for actions to foreclose preferred ship mortgages.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, at 101.
99. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, at 1100.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. amend. VII.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e).
102. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2636-37 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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eliminate the need to use punitive damages in this fashion or make
accommodations for them.
As it turns out, the empirical data suggest that Stevens is
incorrect. Maritime courts do not use punitive damages to make up for
limits on compensation in tort recovery. As a result, maritime law
remains a prime candidate for congressional action to create a
deterrence-maximizing system of awarding punitive damages.
Testing Stevens's hypothesis requires two steps. First, the
alleged restrictions on compensatory recovery in maritime cases must
be identified. Second, these restrictions must be sought in a pool of
verdicts and settlements in order to determine whether there is any
evidence supporting his claim.
First, what exactly are the bogeymen that keep maritime
plaintiffs from proper recovery? Justice Stevens referred to two major
restrictions: (1) the unavailability of damages for negligent infliction
of purely emotional distress, and (2) the Robins Dry Dock doctrine that
limits recovery "for purely 'economic losses . .. absent direct physical
damage to property or a proprietary interest.' "103 Presumably, there is
a third type of restriction: a decedent-plaintiffs representative cannot
recover for loss of society damages or for future earnings in a wrongful
death maritime case after Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.104 Each of these
restrictions merits a more detailed explanation.
First, the rule that purely emotional injuries are not
recoverable in maritime law is nuanced. In Gough v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of America, the Fifth Circuit noted that the assertion
"that the maritime law does not permit recovery for purely emotional
damages" was "too broad."105 Instead, the correct rule is that "purely
emotional injuries will be compensated when maritime plaintiffs
satisfy the physical injury or impact rule."10 6 This holding makes the
maritime rule the same as the once-commonplace tort rule for
emotional-damages recovery: plaintiffs can only recover for emotional
damages when they can first show that they were physically affected
by the defendant's actions. Although this rule has fallen out of favor
for general tort law in most jurisdictions, it appears much less likely
that courts would use punitive damages to compensate for a
"restriction" on recovery that appeared in almost every tort case in the
country only a few decades ago. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that
103. Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14-7, at 124
(4th ed. 2004)).
104. 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
105. 996 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1993).
106. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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this "outdated" rule has remained in place even after most scholars
have concluded that it is unfair to tort victims, and courts have
adjusted accordingly by granting larger punitive-damages awards to
compensate.
Second, Justice Stevens pointed to the general maritime rule
that plaintiffs cannot recover for purely economic losses without
"physical damage to property or a proprietary interest."0 7 This
limitation stems from Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, a 1927
Supreme Court decision. 08 In Robins Dry Dock, an individual
chartered the use of a steamship for a period of two years, subject to
docking at least once every six months. While the ship was docked, the
charter was suspended, as was any payment for it. The docking
company negligently allowed the ship's propeller to be damaged,
extending the amount of time that the vessel remained in port. The
chartering individual then sued the dock for its negligence, claiming
that loss of the use of the ship resulted in economic damages.
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes focused on the issue of
standing and third-party liability.109 Because the dock had not
breached a duty owed to the plaintiff in contract or in tort, Justice
Holmes wrote, the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against the
dock. In a short, terse opinion, the Court denied the plaintiff
recovery.110
Third, maritime law does not allow for a decedent's survivor to
recover for the decedent's lost earnings or the loss of her
companionship."' In Miles, the Court stated its intention to follow the
"uniform plan of maritime tort law Congress created in DOHSA and
the Jones Act" by creating this limitation for maritime common law.112
It is not obvious why Congress would choose to limit recovery in this
context, as this situation is one in which maritime law departs from
standard tort law in a way that appears facially unfair to plaintiffs. It
is also difficult to discern why Justice Stevens would not mention this
limitation on a plaintiffs compensatory recovery in maritime torts.
Nonetheless, it is clearly a limitation, and it is plausible-and even
107. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting SCHOENBAUM, supra note 103, at 124).
108. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
109. Id. at 309.
110. Id. How this straightforward case became a tenet of maritime law is a more complicated
story. Then-Judge Breyer's opinion in Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru offers a useful
explanation. 764 F.2d 50, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1985).
111. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
112. Id. at 37.
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likely-that a judge or jury could use punitive damages to get around
it.
Given these identified restrictions on recovery, the availability
of empirical data on maritime jury verdicts and settlements offers a
convenient means for investigating Justice Stevens's second
argument. The Westlaw database reveals 1,090 reported settlements
and jury verdicts from federal and state courts.113 Out of these cases,
there were fifteen reports of the court specifically setting aside part of
the damages as "punitive" in nature, 14 and six reports of settlements
strongly indicating that the defendant feared liability for punitive
damages in court."6 These data indicate that anywhere from 1.4 to 1.9
percent of the total number of reported verdicts and settlements took
punitive damages into account. Although this number seems low, it
presents a ratio of punitive-damages awards per a number of cases
that is consistent with other empiricists' findings. 116
The results are striking. From this empirical example, it
appears that Justice Stevens was dead wrong in his description of
113. Using Westlaw's Maritime Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlement Summaries
database (abbreviated "MRT-JV"), which consolidates data from reporters across the country, I
found verdicts from courts in Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Texas.
114. Drake v. Long, No. 204-CV-00002-JEG, 2006 WL 3827038 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2006);
Baker v. Exxon Shipping Co., Nos. CV-89-0085-HRH, CV-89-0095-HRH, 2004 WL 573919 (D.
Alaska Jan. 28, 2004) (trial court verdict); Dearmond v. Southwire, No. 99 CV 219, 2002 WL
32171120 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2002); Hague v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 95 Civ 4648, 2001 WL
1829675 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2001); Motts v. M/S Green Wave, 1999 WL 33492057 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
22, 1999); Schotanus vs. Dragon Fishing Co., No. CV950294, 1997 WL 638893 (C.D. Cal. May 29,
1997); Thoms v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., No. 3AN-93-3055, 1994 WL 682852 (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 22,
1994); King v. Wright, No. RGOL1162125, 2006 WL 2325300 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 15, 2006);
Taibl v. Juno Marine Agency, Inc., No. 88-45327 CA 22, 1998 WL 355212 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 23,
1998); Segui v. Kloster Cruise, Ltd., No. 91-11110 CA 06, 1994 WL 865088 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 22,
1994); Siliato v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 89-31781 CA 19, 1990 WL 630147 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec.
1990); Andersen v. Sky Cruises, Ltd., No. 87-8892, 1990 WL 630243 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 1990);
Anslem v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 83-2265, 1984 WL 318070 (Unknown La. state court, Nov. 1984);
Muthana v. Am. Steamship Co., 87-721690-NO, 1989 WL 988612 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 1, 1989);
Newport Harbor Ass'n v. Dicello, No. CVO3-495284, 2005 WL 3750697 (Ohio Ct. C.P. April 8,
2005).
I also found one case where a court awarded punitive damages for a contractual claim, but I
did not include it in the results. Chi Shun Hua Steel Co. v. Crest Tankers, Inc., No. C89-2905
SAW, 1990 WL 10080476 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
115. Calderon v. Freels, No. C86-1081R, 1988 WL 428018 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Witherow v.
Omm, Inc., No. 02-09668 Div. E, 2005 WL 3030126 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 2005); Edenfield v.
Hendry Corp., No. 94-02350, 1994 WL 865382 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994); Schleifman v. P.C.
Hotel Mgmt. Ltd., No. BER-L-04121-01, 2003 WL 21712142 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 27, 2003);
Sanders v. Penrod Drilling Co., No. 90CV0053, 1990 WL 465087 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July, 1988);
Ogaard v. Crowley Maritime Corp., No. 92-2-19380-9, 1994 WL 242115 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 1994).
116. Eisenberg et al., supra note 8, at 275.
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courts' use of punitive damages to make up for restrictions on
compensatory damages in maritime cases. In fact, there was not a
single instance from the group sampled in which this was the case.
The Robins Dry Dock doctrine never played any role in the
cases in which punitive damages were awarded, including cases in
which the plaintiffs settled a punitive-damages claim. In each case,
the plaintiff could claim a real, physical injury as the basis for
liability; the claims of pure economic injury barred by the doctrine
never led to a punitive-damages award. This result is unsurprising:
punitive-damages awards are usually based on a recognized,
underlying physical harm. If a defendant is protected from liability for
compensatory damages by the doctrine, then it will never incur
punitive liability.
Justice Stevens's example only works if a defendant suffered
great economic damages as well as trivial direct damages that were
unconnected to the economic ones. If a court awarded significant
punitive damages for the defendant's direct damages claim, it is
possible to assume that such an award served a compensatory role for
the unrecoverable damages. This situation was not found in any case
in the Westlaw sample, however.
Similarly, none of the cases in the Westlaw sample involved
purely emotional injuries to the defendant. If a defendant is barred
from recovering compensatory damages for his emotional injuries
because there is no physical harm, then the court will not have an
opportunity to award punitive damages. A situation similar to the
hypothetical for economic damages would be necessary for such an
opportunity to occur. A defendant would have to suffer a purely
emotional injury as well as a trivial direct injury that did not directly
give rise to his emotional damages claim. In that case, if the court
awarded large punitive damages, it might be fair to conclude that it
was compensating for the defendant's unrecoverable injuries. Based
upon the results of the study, however, this situation is not occurring.
Finally, the possibility that a court used punitive damages to
make up for the Jones Act's restrictions on recovery for loss of
consortium and lost future wages was the closest call, but it still was
not borne out in the data. There were eight cases in which the
plaintiffs appeared to have grounds for a loss-of-consortium claim. Of
these eight, five of the jury verdicts included recovery for loss of
consortium on statutory or state-law grounds; the punitive-damages
awards could not be compensatory, as the loss-of-consortium damages
were explicitly included in the compensatory recovery. Of the
remaining three cases, two were decided before the Supreme Court's
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decision in Miles that limited recovery for loss of consortium damages
in those jurisdictions that allowed such recovery.
The one remaining report is of the most recent case, Drake v.
Long."7 Mr. Drake was a commercial fisherman hired by the plaintiffs
to guide a trip in 2003. He injured his back lifting an eighty-pound bag
of shrimp and sued the ship's owners under the Jones Act, claiming
that the defendants were negligent and that the vessel was not
seaworthy. Mr. Drake also claimed that the defendants attempted to
conceal their liability by driving the ship onto a jetty and destroying
the evidence. The defendants admitted liability, and a jury awarded
Mr. Drake $250,000 in compensatory damages and an additional
$250,000 in punitive damages, presumably based on the defendants'
attempt to conceal their wrongdoing.
The defendants' conduct appeared to be sufficient to merit
punitive liability, without the need for further compensation. The best
solution was to mark this case as unclear. Thus, Stevens's theory
remains without any empirical evidence.
Maritime law presents Congress with the perfect opportunity
to pass legislation reforming the system of awarding punitive
damages. The legislature can act in a way that prevents forum
shopping and precludes any concerns about the Seventh Amendment,
all the while without unraveling a system of awards that serves an
additional compensatory purpose.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Congress should pass legislation establishing a framework
where judges, not juries, award punitive damages in maritime cases.
The judges should be guided by a comprehensive set of guidelines that
optimizes the deterrent value of the award. Installing this sort of
system would provide a coherent model for punitive-damages doctrine
that would serve as an example that the states and courts could adopt.
A. Why Judges?
In Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Polinsky and
Shavell argue that proper jury instructions can correct most of the
problems with current punitive-damages jurisprudence.11 8 Polinsky
and Shavell provide a model for these instructions that outlines the
117. No. 2:04-CV-00002-JEG, 2006 WL 3827038 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2006).
118. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 957-62.
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proper considerations in cases of claims for tort damages against
individuals and corporations. 119
The complicating factor of these model instructions is that they
include an allowance for the punitive-damages awards to serve a
"punishing function." As discussed above, this function is not optimal
in terms of economic benefit. 120 Polinsky and Shavell seem to
recognize this reality, and the allowance of punitive damages for
"punishment" appears to be a concession to the wide acceptance of this
role for punitive damages in the federal courts. 121
Professor W. Kip Viscusi tests these instructions with a
questionnaire distributed to citizens in the Austin, Texas area. 122 He
concludes that juries are significantly unwilling or unable to use the
instructions in developing optimal punitive-damages awards to
accomplish deterrence.123 But Viscusi's study offers hope for a judicial
answer to the inquiry. He notes that "[iun situations in which the
median juror had sound judgment and was able to properly interpret
the punitive damages instruction, the jury performance was quite
good . . . ."12 4 He also concludes that levels of education directly
correspond with the numbers of correct answers. 125
In the concluding chapter of the book Punitive Damages: How
Juries Decide, Professor Cass Sunstein offers two alternative solutions
to resolve the current unpredictability and inefficiency of punitive-
damages awards. Either judges should take a "firmer role" in the
award process, or the courts should adopt a more-rigid damage
schedule in order to produce optimal award amounts. 126 In essence,
this Note proposes that Congress can impose a solution that
incorporates both of these elements. For maritime cases, Congress
can, and should, create a statutory mechanism that ensures punitive-
damages awards are calculated by trained, educated judges who rely
on mandatory guidelines to create awards that optimize deterrence.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part III.A.2.
121. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 51, at 948.
122. W. Kip Viscusi, Deterrence Instructions: What Juries Won't Do, in CASs R. SUNSTEIN ET
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 142-65 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
123. Id. at 162-64.
124. Id. at 164.
125. Id. at 162.




B. Substantive Text of the Proposed Legislation
The legislation this Note proposes does not need to be a
detailed plan of action in order to accomplish the goal of implementing
a new method for awarding punitive damages. The bill only needs four
basic parts.
1. Purpose Section
First, Congress should include an explicit purpose section in
the bill. Legislation that abrogates a Supreme Court holding-even
one that is only based on common-law authority-always carries the
risk of unfavorable judicial interpretation. Congress should
specifically target the Baker holding: "This Bill is designed to institute
a workable framework for limiting punitive-damages awards under
maritime law. This Act should be read as setting the federal standard
in all maritime cases filed after the day of its enactment."
Second, Congress also should establish its system for awarding
punitive damages in maritime cases as the sole, mandatory, and
uniform federal law on the matter. This stated purpose would work in
conjunction with the operational part of the bill, which will abrogate
the states' abilities to assign punitive damage claims to juries.
In sum, the purpose section would satisfy two requirements.
First, it would provide a future Court with a clear indication of
congressional intent helpful in abrogating the Baker holding's limit on
punitive damages. Second, this clear exercise of federal lawmaking
authority would erase any doubts about the Court's common-law
authority and the states' residual authority under maritime law, at
least with regard to punitive damages in maritime cases.
2. Findings Section
Along with this purpose, Congress should include a findings
section that includes two provisions. First, it should declare, "In order
for punitive damages to serve their proper purpose and deter
defendants from imposing costs on society, they must be awarded in a
predictable and consistent fashion." Second, Congress should find,
"Because awarding punitive damages under maritime law concerns
important matters that transverses the states' borders and affect
interstate commerce, the appropriate response should be in the form
of federal legislation, not state responses."
The first finding serves two different purposes. First, it sets the
goal of punitive damages as deterring tortfeasors from current and
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future conduct that imposes social costs. Deterrence is the only proper
goal for punitive damages, and the one that allows for issuance of the
most predictable and consistent awards. 127 While it would be ideal for
Congress to reject outright the use of punitive damages to compensate
plaintiffs or add extra punishment to the defendant's liability, this
finding would work with the operational section of the statute to that
effect without the political mess that would accompany a rejection of
the compensating or punishing roles.
Second, the finding that punitive damages should be
predictable acknowledges the substantive concerns expressed by
corporations that punitive damages are awarded haphazardly and
without connection to actual conduct. The new punitive-damages
award system is inherently "fair" in that it is calibrated to prevent
actors from passing on costs to those not responsible for them. Instead
of a doctrine of punitive damages that relies on the outrageousness of
the defendant's conduct or the magnitude of its revenue, this finding
represents the new framework's direct relation to the defendant's
conduct.
Finally, the finding that the issue of punitive damages
demands the enactment of appropriate federal legislation would
satisfy the doctrinal requirements necessary to effect the preemption
of state law by federal maritime law. State laws are preempted in
maritime cases if they "contravene a clearly established rule of
general maritime law," or if they "impair the principle of national
uniformity that underlies the federal and maritime admiralty
statutes."128 Declaring the uniformity concerns of punitive-damages
jurisprudence would make it clear that the operational provisions
removing jurisdiction of maritime cases from state courts and making
federal judges the decisionmakers would preempt any contrary state
laws.129
127. See supra Part III.A.1.
128. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 91 (citing Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573 (1974)).
129. The Findings Section might also be helpful in gathering political support for the new
law. Congress recently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123
Stat. 5 (2009), to re-write the statutory filing deadline for Title VII discrimination cases after the
Supreme Court gave it a narrow interpretation in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007). The Act included a Findings Section that capitalized on the unpopular nature of




The bill should include a separate operational section that
implements the major changes in the law. This section would establish
the comprehensive framework for adjudicating maritime punitive-
damages claims in either federal or state court.
Congress should first make a judge the ultimate decisionmaker
on the issue of punitive damages. In order to mandate bench trials for
punitive-damages claims, Congress will need to take two steps. First,
it should include a provision amending 28 U.S.C. § 1333 by including a
new subsection (3): "No state court shall have jurisdiction over 'suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled' if
the claims are for punitive damages." Second, Congress must pass a
new statute stating that "all claims for punitive damages in maritime
cases are to be decided by a judge, not a jury."
Congress should then issue uniform instructions for a federal
judge to consider in determining an award of punitive damages. These
instructions should mirror the ones proposed by Polinksy and Shavell,
with one major exception: there should not be a provision for awarding
punitive damages for retributive purposes. As discussed above,
socially optimal use of punitive damages precludes such use.
The deterrent portions of the model instructions seem well-
suited to promoting optimal awards for deterrence, as evidenced by
their acceptance by several scholars. Congress should also include
Polinsky and Shavell's multiplier as a key part of this framework, as it
provides the basis for the efficient deterrence rationale.
4. Effect on Other Statutes
In the fourth section, Congress should explain the bill's effect
on related federal laws. Congress should expand the limit imposed to
the bill to punitive-damages awards under the Jones Act and the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. There is no reason
why the protections afforded to seamen and longshoremen should be
different from those offered to other maritime plaintiffs. Congress
should recognize that in this bill.
This simple legislative move would eliminate a substantial
area of confusion among the circuit courts stemming from the Miles
decision. In setting a limit for punitive damages in cases brought
under these acts, Congress also would be able to clarify that punitive
damages are available for those cases as well.
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V. CONCLUSION
Punitive-damages jurisprudence has reached a critical stage.
At this point, it seems unlikely that the courts will implement any
new restrictions on damage awards based on constitutional due
process. The areas where the courts retain common-law-making
authority have dwindled to a tiny set of subjects, precluding judicial
intervention of the type the Supreme Court exercised in Baker. Most
states have fought the legislative battle to create limitations on
punitive-damages recovery and aren't eager to reopen the issue. As a
whole, punitive-damages doctrine has reached an uneasy stalemate
that no one is happy with.
It is time to adopt a meaningful framework for defining the role
and magnitude of damages in tort cases. Awarding punitive damages
in a way that maximizes efficient deterrence is the only function that
promotes social welfare and creates incentives for legislatures to
better define tort laws. By taking bold action in the field of maritime
law, Congress can set the gold standard for developing a meaningful
and coherent punitive-damages jurisprudence.
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